CALL TO ORDER
BOR Chair JoAnn Ryan called the meeting to order at 1:02 p.m. Pam Heleen added that a quorum of the Board was present. Chair Ryan thanked Chair and Vice Chair of the Faculty Advisory Committee Dr. Colena Sesanker and Dr. David Blitz for putting the agenda together for the meeting.

FAC PRESENTATIONS
Dr. Colena Sesanker, FAC Chair, Gateway Recurring State Support Attachment A
Dr. Stephen Adair, FAC Emeritus, CCSU Transition Costs Attachment B
Dr. Francis Coan, FAC Emeritus, Tunxis Enrollment Projections Attachment C
Dr. Brendan Cunningham, FAC Eastern Completion Attachment D
Dr. David Blitz: FAC Vice Chair, CCSU FAC-BOR Relations Attachment E

CLOSING REMARKS:
President Cheng provided closing remarks stating that we need to continue to work together even more collaboratively.
ADJOURN:
The meeting adjourned at 2:28 p.m. after a motion by Regent Porth, a second by Regent Wright, and a unanimous voice vote.
On Recurring State Funding Allocations

In 2017 two things happened: The state’s fiscal guardrails were tightened and the Students First plan was unleashed, promising savings from the community college sector of the CSCU system. The context was a serious debt crisis at the state level and a 123-day stalemate during which the state operated without a budget. Things looked dismal and the CSCU system pledged to do its part by consolidating in the pursuit of efficiencies.

The budget of the community colleges was targeted because we could. No substantive conversation about whether we should was engaged, however, at the body entrusted with oversight of the system. Not a single Regent asked questions at the BOR meeting at which the students first consolidation plan was approved. No one even questioned its claims regarding savings and timing: would one-time costs of the transition really total only $2.1M?\(^1\) Could a project this large be successfully accomplished by July 1 2023? And, later, when the narrative switched from savings to aspirations of equity and antiracism, it appears that no one made sure that the state promised levels of support that would make even aspirations toward equality possible, much less these lofty goals.\(^2\) As a result, here we are today moving resolutely backward, on a trajectory that would only magnify the existing racial and economic inequality in this state.

It was taken for granted that it was reasonable to ask the CSCU system to cut its funding in 2017. Let’s look at that assumption, using the reasoning that underlies the justification for further funding reductions 5 years later:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2007</th>
<th>FY2011</th>
<th>FY2017</th>
<th>FY2019</th>
<th>FY2023</th>
<th>FY2024</th>
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<td>297,428,789</td>
<td>316,887,597</td>
<td>308,478,071</td>
<td>287,099,697</td>
<td>350,989,155</td>
<td>357,848,956</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>10,512,732</td>
<td>11,646,005</td>
<td>11,396,725</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECURRING IN 2007 DOLLARS</td>
<td>292,170,364</td>
<td>270,484,577</td>
<td>241,631,531</td>
<td>247,099,598</td>
<td>251,604,034</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONE TIME FUNDS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>142,708,926</td>
<td>209,200,000</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>316,887,597</td>
<td>317,880,571</td>
<td>297,612,429</td>
<td>505,344,086</td>
<td>759,445,720</td>
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<tr>
<td>total in 2007 $</td>
<td>344,341,460</td>
<td>344,341,460</td>
<td>344,341,460</td>
<td>344,341,460</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
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<td>58,655</td>
<td>519,12</td>
<td>500,31</td>
<td>419,63</td>
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[** These numbers exclude fringe, PACT, and unique expenses like 27th payroll and backdated SEBAC increases]

In the decade leading up to the consolidation decision, the system had already suffered years of cuts, if measured in real dollars.

- Between 2007 and 2017, adjusted for inflation, system funding had decreased by 9.1%.
- During that same time period, enrollment had increased by 8.6%
- Two years on (2019), enrollment had dipped down but was still up by 4.5% relative to 2007. Recurring state funding, however, was down by 18.76%, if measured in 2007 dollars.\(^3\)
- Though enrollment is much lower in 2023 than in 2007, adjusting for inflation, funding decreased by a larger increment.

\(^1\) March 2018 Substantive Change Request. Appendix LL
\(^3\) Note that, given the 2017 modifications to the fiscal guardrails that require that the spending cap increase as a function of the greater of the percentage increase in either average personal income over the preceding five calendar years or inflation over the previous calendar year. This reduction and all reductions to the block grant and other recurring funding is particularly telling of the state’s long-term commitments to us.
The system never really recovered from the Great Recession. And it is likely that our failure to recover has had consequences for the state’s recovery more generally.

A lot happened between 2020 and today, both in the world and with one-time funding regarding our system. I will address that below. But by 2019, we were twelve years into dwindling funding in the face of rising enrollment. That took a toll. Today, in 2023, we are told that because of expected enrollment decreases due to demographic trends (that are not straightforwardly applicable to the significant non-traditional student population in the system) we must pare back to anchors set by these pre-pandemic funding levels as our one-time funds are weaned away over the next few years. But those levels were unacceptable.

In addition to the depleted pre-pandemic block grant levels, a 2023 fringe benefit restructure reduces state funding even further, in a way that threatens to escalate as time goes on, and which affects the community colleges particularly severely:

CSCU net fringe costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Fringe Costs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>30,164,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>48,739,213</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>83,974,631</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>96,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>93,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>82,400,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>43,700,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>57,796,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>129,293,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For CSCU as a whole:

- In FY 2024 fringe costs are 429% of what they were in 2007
- They are 265% of what they were at CSCU’s inception in 2011
- They are 34% higher (about $33M more) than the highest net cost in the past 5 years

- For the community colleges, this fiscal year’s fringe costs are almost twice as much ($40M) as they were at their high point in 2019 ($23M)

CTState Net Fringe Costs

The fringe cost restructure adopted in the legislative session of 2023 left non-retirement fringe to be paid from the CSCU block grant while the state covers the retirement portion directly. It was advertised

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4 I believe they are the highest ever costs, but must confirm.
as budget neutral but, clearly, that is not the case. If CTState fringe projections are correct, the fringe restructure represents a cut of tens of millions.\(^5\)

The state’s office of policy and management claims that the system must be prepared to return to ‘pre-pandemic levels of funding’ and that, because of declining enrollment, we should be able to do so without increasing tuition.\(^6\) Based on the measures quoted by budget director Beckham, it appears that 2019 - a year record low point in state support is the level to which he is anchored. Factoring in the new net cost of fringe, recurring funding in FY24 (excluding one-time funds) is significantly lower than even that low point.

On November 15th, institutions in the system presented mitigation plans. The $26.7 million shortfall in FY24 has been eliminated entirely by a variety of measures including some terminations of non-permanent workers. 76% of the FY25 shortfall has been covered by a combination of reserves (19%), spending reductions--including more workforce reductions (46%), new revenue initiatives (28%) and technical adjustments (7%) but a $47.6M budget hole remains. CT State and Western are worst off.

CT State proposes to eliminate even more educational assistants who staff our labs, tutoring centers, library, and virtually every student services area in the college. It aims to reduce course offerings (to save adjunct costs) by 776 courses.

Because the community college workforce is about 75% contingent workers (educational assistants, adjuncts, etc who are employed on short term contracts without benefits) non-renewals of these contracts can be accomplished without much fanfare, but will leave our campuses decimated. Reductions since July 1 2023 have already impacted the most vulnerable directly.\(^7\)

This is a death plan, not a survival plan. OPM justifies our funding by enrollment and we’ve put forward a plan that sabotages both enrollment and retention. Its consequences would justify further cuts the next time around. But it doesn’t seem that anything better is possible within the budget constraints we’ve been given.

These planned reductions in staffing come after the reductions already made (and felt) since July 1 2023, and after 5 years of Students First during which $34.5 million was captured by leaving vacated positions open.\(^8\) We have already cut our workforce significantly.

This was all after at least a decade (2007-2017) of block grant erosion when accounting for inflation.

Today the Office of Policy and Management claims that funding should be reduced to respond to a declining traditional-student-aged population. In the previous 5 years, funding was to be reduced to achieve equity and antiracism through consolidation- a claim that is contradictory on its face. In the decade before that, funding was reduced despite increasing enrollment.

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\(^5\) In addition, the rate at which the state spending cap increases is a function of the greater of the percentage increase in either average personal income over the preceding five calendar years or inflation over the previous calendar year. Non-retirement fringe costs, however, are not tied to those measures. It is entirely possible that, in the future, steep increases to non-retirement fringe might exceed the rate at which the cap increases, causing the block grant to lag behind costs, resulting in further cuts to funds available for operations.

\(^6\) https://ctmirror.org/2023/11/12/ct-higher-education-funding-spending-cap-uconn-cscu/

\(^7\) Reduced tutoring, disability services, veterans services, library hours (making the library inaccessible to some working students, etc.

\(^8\) June 21 2023 email to FAC chairs from CTState CFO Kerry Kelly in response to an info request on the cost of consolidation
The state’s position on higher education appears only ever to be to reduce support. None of the various justifications underlying that conclusion should be regarded in good faith and engaged seriously. The population CSCU benefits is the portion of the state that is also the most heavily tax burdened—they deserve quality services\textsuperscript{9}. In 2017, it targeted the public higher education population with the largest percentage of non-white students, the highest percentage of first-generation students, the largest percentage of students in poverty to bear the brunt of the downsizing. The CSCU system complied and added insult to injury by marketing the structural adjustments to accommodate reductions in services to an already disproportionately underserved population (read: structural injustice) as some sort of accomplishment in the service of those it would hurt the most\textsuperscript{10}.

I hope that it is evident that this is a position the current board and system leadership cannot responsibly take. And that until we can aspire to mere equality, adequacy, bare viability for all of our institutions, there should be no talk of equity, which is a higher standard, at the board level. This is a system with aspirations appropriate to the 1950s in a state that cannot figure out how to desegregate it’s capital city’s schools and has just devastated the colleges that bridge the gap between those largely underfunded schools and the possibility of college.

A future where all one-time funding is stripped away to 2019 levels is one that is unsustainable.

Recurring funding matters because of the spending cap. The rate at which it is sustained it can only increase incrementally and, after it was tightened in 2017, the dollar amount of our block grant actually dipped down, initially. This is telling of the commitment the state has to our support in the long run.

The conversation about public higher ed has only ever proceeded from arbitrary historical levels of funding, despite a disappointing status quo. We have only ever been talking about the state budget. The conversation about public higher ed has to be had and funding targets must be anchored to the needs of the people of the state and this conversation should include consideration of:

- Income inequality in the state
- Racial inequality in the state
- Our inability to desegregate k-12
- Increased needs for post-pandemic students
- Exceptionally wide range of student preparedness given more school districts than there are towns and non-traditional students
- Challenges of transition from twelve colleges to one
- Workforce needs, especially teacher and nursing shortages
- The open enrollment nature of community colleges as well as their many disparate functions
- The needs of working adults with families
- The high cost of living in the state that makes food insecurity and houselessness a constant threat for so many of our students and employees.
- The realities of other public services, including public transport in our state

On Management and oversight

Here are some of the one time funds we’ve received over the past few years:

Since 2020 there has been significant one-time money to respond to the challenges of the pandemic:

- In 2020 and 2021, HEERF I, II, and III, GEERF, and CRF totaled $390,513,191.
- In 2022 $21,600,002 ARPA funds for wages and $10,000,000 in ARPA funds.
- In 2023, a total of $256,208,926
  - Removing PACT, which goes to the student, not to the institution
    - $241,208,926
  - Minus unique costs (27th payroll, backdated SEBAC agreement)
    - $207,208,926
- In 2024 these one-time funds total $232,700,00
  - Minus PACT
    - $209,200,000
- In 2025 $104,800,000
  - Minus PACT
    - $76,300,00

To keep block grant levels equal to 2007, adjusting for inflation, it would have had to be $440M in 2023. Including one-time funds the system received $505,344,086 in 2023. The costs and challenges introduced by the pandemic are ongoing. But is there more to the story?

In the current year, FY2024, the system received $578,445,720 total, including one-time funds.

In 2025, total funding matches 2007 levels. But with $76,300,000 scheduled to disappear the following year.

We must give an account of how this money has been used if we are to make the strongest arguments for more funding. Certainly, the pandemic has ongoing costs and challenges. But a missing piece of the puzzle is the costs of consolidation. Accomplishing what was the largest merger of its kind to create the largest community college in New England had to have cost something.

At least some of it was spent building a consolidated college that wasn’t designed to address the issues of the colleges, our students, or the state. We were assigned to chase the bogeymen of enrollment and graduation rates divorced from the question of whether or not those were measures of how well we

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11 I have made no effort to be exhaustive or particularly precise with this accounting of one time funds. The point is only that the system has at least $1B in one time funding to account for to explain the shortfall
12 COVID relief fund spreadsheet appended $171,756,555 to the universities and $390,513,191 to the colleges.
13 deficiency funding for wages from ARPA p.38 F7I 2/8/23 https://ct-edu-b-cdn.net/files/bor/Finance-Agenda-02-08-2023.pdf also: (p.58 of 76)
14 PACT boosts enrollment but that enrollment does not bring in enough funds through tuition that it is not a burden on the institution without institutional funding.
15 This number differs from what appears in the state budget (HB6941) does not include
  - PACT, which goes to the student, not the institution and which boosts enrollment for which tuition does not cover costs.
  - Costs unique to 2023: backdated SEBAC costs, 27th payroll
  - Fringe support accounted for elsewhere
serve those interests. We can, with great effort, wrangle it into the thing it ought to be now, but not without resources.

Faculty and staff governance across the system opposed the restructure knowing its savings and enrollment projections to be unachievable...or rather, if they were to be achieved it would be by way of the reductions of services and workforce that we now face, not via the implausible plan presented on paper. Likewise, all the unions in the system opposed it. Consider this quote from p.10 of the 6/9/2021 F7I board packet: “In FY 24, as COVID relief funds expire the additional tuition revenue of $18.53 million exceeds the costs of $11.93 million, and by FY 25 the Guided Pathways Advising is self-supporting.”

A couple of unions went as far as putting up a billboard to get the governor’s attention, hoping to be saved from what we face today. But the unrealistic projections continued to be accepted by the board without comment and the consolidation plodded on according to schedule to the July 1 2023 launch date.

The state asked for this restructure and the system delivered but not a cent was (officially) allocated to the project. Every investment came out of the funding meant for our colleges and current students. The resulting understaffing and depleted resources were felt on campus throughout. It is time to acknowledge the financial cost at least. The real costs are far greater.

Stephen Adair and Fran Coan will address ways to understand the discrepancy between what was projected and what has actually occurred and discuss the way these consistent failures to meet projections and goals contributes to the position in which we find ourselves.

Among these misalignments—the number/influence of executives who have no role in the day-to-day functioning of any institution and for whom student interaction is not part of their job description has increased significantly in recent years. First, after the 2011 merger with the creation of the system office and then as a consequence of the 2017 Students First Plan. By 2021 there was a slate of consolidation managers who had no role at any of the existing community colleges, totaling $10.5 million in salaries. Given that there was no state allocation to cover the cost of the creation of CTState community college, these salaries and all transition costs were paid from the block grant to the community colleges, diverting funds away from students and local institutions without there ever being any explicit

16 12 Institutions voted nor confidence in the Students First Plan, Mark Ojakian, and the Board of Regents in May 2019. There are dozens of resolutions opposing specifics of the plan.
17 See, for just one example, Dr. Coan’s accounting, in this packet, of the March 2022 projection of a 14.1% increase in enrollment, that was adjusted down to 6.1% three months later. The actual increase in enrollment was 1.2% from a particularly low baseline- a historically low increase versus a projection that would have been a record high. Or see Dr. Adair’s analysis, also in this packet, of the difference between the projected number of non-teaching FTE and reality.
18 Statement of Unity in Opposition to Student First from 5 unions https://drive.google.com/file/d/19yuVMv2Ettc0OGjC1W964Nh-5Dx032A4y/view
19 From the June 9 2022 Finance and Infrastructure board packet p. 49-50 “by using a combination of federal HEERF Institutional, ARPA, and IREPO funding Guided Pathways is implemented at scale across all campuses by June 2022, exceeding the board established goal.” --Just as FY2023 was about to begin the finance and infrastructure committee of the BOR continued to endorse the hiring of 174 new positions using one-time pandemic funding. The projections that supported such a decision were preposterous
20 Perhaps we can regard some of these one time funds as an unofficial investment from the state in the opening of the new college but that, too, is problematic since what they will have decided to invest in, then, is a college with fewer offerings and support, at higher cost to students. A project that was advertised as motivated by aspirations toward equity and antiracism.
21 2021 Students First Executive roster and calculations of the now-defunct Regional president role can be provided by FAC co-chairs.
authorization for this use of state funds. Likewise, it is unclear how the system office charges institutions for its services.

The argument here is not that the rising costs of managerial salaries has caused the budgetary shortfall. Rather, the question is- what effect has this diversion of funds and these levels of management had? It is executive leadership that put forward the unachievable projections while faculty and staff pointed out the obvious. CSCU leadership opened the college that had been promised as a path to the “Eradication of Systemic Inequities in Higher Education” defunded and boasting reductions in services with much more to come. When they promised Black and Latinx students that “Connecticut State Community College is being built for you” what, exactly, was intended?

While CSCU leadership focused on ensuring no deviation from the Student’s First plan, interaction between institution leaders and the BOR decreased and, after years of failing to evaluate university presidents, the official story is that Western was left to the mismanagement of a president who ran the university into fiscal crisis.

Now the language of “consolidation”, “streamlining”, and “efficiency”-- the bippety, boppety, and boo of the magical thinking that has led us down blind alleys only to turn back at great expense over the past few years-- has arisen once again. 22 There comes a point at which you can’t cut more and survive. We have been saying that we’re past that point at the community colleges for years now. It has been hard to hear us over the noise that has historically been broadcast from the system office but let’s attempt to turn a new page before we double down on the mistakes of the past. The universities are already poised to be collateral damage from the community college experiment, let’s not extend this strategy to them more directly.

This calendar year alone, we have received three distinct narratives about the aspirations, forecast, and projected consequences of our circumstances in the CSCU system: January 24, April 24, and Nov 15. At no time has that narrative been responsive to an analysis of the dynamic needs and historical challenges of the state of Connecticut or contextualized by such an analysis. The state has fully acknowledged its failure to honor its commitments in the form of pension liabilities in past years. What we have not talked about is the state’s current failure to honor its commitments- or, perhaps, the absence of any such commitments- to its future.

It is time for us to lead that conversation.

22 https://ctmirror.org/2023/11/12/ct-higher-education-funding-spending-cap-uconn-cscu/ “Balducci said he believes the plan will focus on consolidation, trying to preserve as much as possible through efficiency.” Meanwhile the shared services model has failed and is likely to be unraveled soon, the regional structure of CTState is being dismantled and the regional presidents eliminated, etc. All a great cost and disruption
## Connecticut State Colleges & Universities

### CARES / CRHSA Federal Grants

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<th></th>
<th>2020 HEERF I</th>
<th>2021 HEERF II</th>
<th>2021 HEERF III America Rescue Plan (est.)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>GEERF - Gov CRF Funds</th>
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<td>49,927,821</td>
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<td><strong>Community Techs Total</strong></td>
<td>28,912,868</td>
<td>64,562,256</td>
<td>234,753,908</td>
<td>268,382,073</td>
<td>823,019</td>
<td>8,130,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Charter Oak State</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>218,814</td>
<td>598,567</td>
<td>781,366</td>
<td>152,061</td>
<td>74,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL CSC</strong></td>
<td>94,582,168</td>
<td>108,304,628</td>
<td>189,928,599</td>
<td>353,241,095</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>66,471,796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Source of the Community College Fiscal Crisis

In the initial planning for the community college consolidation, a simple method was used to calculate the projected savings. An organizational chart established that the new college would require 163 fewer non-teaching, FTE-staff members to operate. The projected savings were determined by adding up the salaries and fringe benefit costs paid in FY 2018 for the 163 positions. The total came to $27.8 million of annual savings (an average cost of $170,522 for salary and fringe for each FTE position).

For a time, the system office continued to update the BOR on the progress toward this projected savings target. But now, this method seems to have been wholly forgotten or abandoned.

The fact that the BOR and the system office have not expressed any interest in determining the savings or the cost of the consolidation is both surprising and concerning for the following reasons:

- The BOR is the fiduciary for the system and as such, it should regularly and transparently monitor the financial consequences of its own decisions.
- The state legislature has expressed its interest by passing legislation that requires regular reporting on the savings or the cost of the consolidation.
- AGB advises Higher Education Boards to engage in periodic self-assessments, which seemingly ought to include a sober review of the most consequential decision (the consolidation of the colleges) the BOR has made.
- IPEDS expects systems to report on the financial impacts of institutional mergers.
- Across New England and the country, many state systems are considering institutional mergers to reduce administrative costs. Honest dissemination of the results in Connecticut would be an expression of good citizenry that would help inform decision-making elsewhere.
- The completion of the consolidation has not resulted in the greater fiscal stability that was predicted, but instead it seems to have precipitated a systemwide financial crisis that is most acute for the one community college. Ironically, Connecticut’s OPM is telling the CSCU system that we need to restructure to live within our means just as a restructuring is completed that promised to get us to just such a place.

If the savings target for the consolidation had been realized, even approximately, then the SO and the BOR would have great interest in documenting this achievement. Its absence, therefore, invites the inference that the actual results are wide of the forecasted amounts.

Using publicly available documents, it is not possible to accurately calculate the actual savings or the cost of the consolidation.

This inability partially stems from a lack of specificity in the savings targets outlined in the June 2018 “CSCU – Update on Administrative Cost Savings Plan,”¹ which was a departure from the initial “Preliminary Quantification – Students First (Community College Consolidation)”² that provided specific targeted savings projections for each year from FY 2017 through FY 2021. The projections indicated that administrative staffing levels would be reduced by 163 FTE positions to realize $27.8 million in annual

savings by 2021. This original quantification, however, was based on a projection that the consolidation would be completed by August 2019. After NEASC failed to approve the initial consolidation plan, the administration acknowledged that the consolidation would take longer and that the existing 12 colleges would need to retain their respective accreditations until the consolidation was completed by the summer of 2023. The revised plan still promised an eventual reduction of 163 FTE positions to realize the same targeted savings, but it also stated that the savings would need to be completed in three phases. Time horizons and defining criteria for the three phases were not specified. The June 2018 Update did imply that some reductions and savings would occur each year as the system moved toward the consolidation college.

In the graph below, the projected staffing reductions of non-teaching faculty in the Initial Quantification and the Update are represented by the yellow line and the tan respectively. The data for the tan line assumed that the reduction in staffing would be achieved by FY 2025 and the yearly reductions in staff were averaged over the time frame.

Although it would be seemingly simple enough for the system office to compare these staff projections with the actual staff levels, there are no publicly available documents provided by the system office to make this comparison. Ben Barnes, however, did share with the Faculty Advisory Committee a spreadsheet from May 2023 that showed the number of full-time employees at the community colleges, working in shared services, and working at the system office for the community colleges from 2019 through to an estimate for FY 2024.

The blue line represents the total number of Classified, Administrative, and Managerial/Professional full-time employees at the Community Colleges and working for the Community Colleges in Shared Services or at the System Office. Between 2019 to 2023, the number of full-time, non-faculty staff increased from 1145.3 to 1384.15. Over the same time frame, the number of full-time faculty members (which includes teaching faculty, librarians and counselors), decreased from 922 to 831 (with an additional reduction predicted in 2024 to 818.)
These data do not provide a definitive basis for determining a final cost for the consolidation, but they do provide substantial evidence that the consolidation cost the state of Connecticut many tens of millions of dollars.

Several additional observations and caveats are warranted:

- We do not have data to compare staffing levels in 2019 with what they had been in 2017. It is possible to suppose that some reductions between 2017 and 2019 partially offset the increases after 2020.

- The early projections for savings associated with the consolidation were based on reductions in FTE non-faculty staff, while the data provided by Barnes to the FAC listed Full-time and Part-time positions. The graph only presents the data for Full-time employees, and the results might appear somewhat different if the data were converted into FTE employees. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that the number of FTE, non-faculty staff would appear as roughly 10 to 15 percent larger than the number of full-time staff.

- The original consolidation plan pledged to maintain faculty positions while reducing administrative staff. Indeed, President Ojakian often remarked that he hoped to be able to hire additional faculty by reducing the cost of administration. In 2019, the ratio of staff to faculty was 1.24 (1145/922); in 2023, the ratio had risen to 1.66 (1384/831). This irony should not be lost.

- The decline in faculty full-time positions over the last four years might be regarded as a reasonable and necessary response to the sharp drop in enrollments at the community colleges. If so, would it not then also be reasonable to suppose that the number of non-faculty staff would also drop accordingly? Perhaps then, in estimating a cost of the consolidation, we should not simply compare the changes from 2019 to 2023, but instead compare the number in 2023 with what it would be if the ratio of staff to faculty had remained constant (831*1.24= 1030).
• The difference in non-teaching full-time staff for 2023 between what it actual was versus what it would have been if the ratio to teaching faculty stayed the same is 354. A conservative possible estimate for the cost of the consolidation (versus doing nothing) in 2023 alone is well over $60 million (354 *170,522).

Although more data would be necessary to determine a total cost of the consolidation, the data presented here provide enough evidence to diagnose the source of the current fiscal crisis for the community colleges.
Over the past decade, the Connecticut State Colleges and Universities (CSCU) system has failed regularly to achieve projected enrollment goals. This has been particularly true for the community colleges (now Connecticut State Community College), where the gap between forecast and actual enrollment increased substantially following the implementation of the Students First consolidation plan in late 2018. This pattern of failure calls into question the validity of CSCU planning processes, the methodology used to predict enrollment, and the credibility and competence of those making—and those approving—the projections. Moreover, it has exacerbated system (particularly community college) fiscal problems.

From FY14 through FY23, the Connecticut Community Technical Colleges (CCC) system met its enrollment targets only once, and the Connecticut State University (CSU) system just twice (see graph below):

Overall, however, the CSUs did a significantly better job of projection, especially FY14 to FY18, and came close to realizing their enrollment goals in five of the eight years in which they fell short.¹

During this period, the aggregate full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment projection shortfall for the CSUs was 4248. For the community colleges, the shortfall was much larger: 12,282. From FY20 through FY23 alone, the CCC FTE deficit was 9044. Translating this student deficit into dollars, one arrives at a figure of more than $46 million in revenue that never materialized because the prognosticators, and those who accepted their calculations, were wrong.² The missing revenue equaled at least 2.2 percent of total CCC expenditures (a bit over $2 billion) during these years, and the equivalent of at least 7.7 percent of tuition and fees actually realized.³ Currently, this sum of money would suffice to fully fund, with a surplus, one of the small community colleges/campuses (Asnuntuck, Northwestern, or Quinebaug Valley) for two years, two of these schools/campuses for a year, or one of the medium-sized schools/campuses (Tunxis, Three Rivers, or Capital) for a year.⁴

The most egregious—and, more troubling, seemingly deliberate—example of CCC enrollment projection miscalculation occurred last year. In March 2022, CSCU management submitted a substantive change request to the New England Commission of Higher Education (NECHE) to secure accreditation for Connecticut State Community College (CSCC). The request included forecasts for Connecticut community college enrollment through FY28. For the period FY 22 to FY23, FTE enrollment was projected to increase an incredible 14.1 percent, with 81.6 of the increase credited to the implementation and expansion of the Pledge to Advance Connecticut (PACT) program and the hiring of 174 Guided Pathways advisors.⁵ Just three months later, however, a Finance and Infrastructure Committee report projected a much smaller, although still optimistic, 6.1 percent community college enrollment increase for FY 23.⁶ Not surprisingly, both forecasts proved far wide of the mark. The actual increase was a paltry 1.2 percent, and this from an enrollment baseline 38.5 percent smaller than it had been a decade earlier.⁷

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² Figures gleaned and percentages calculated from the following Finance and Infrastructure Committee staff reports: 10 June 2020, p. 35; 9 June 2021, p. 39; 9 June 2022, p. 57; 21 June 2023, p. 52. 9 June 2022, p. 53
³ Figures gleaned and percentages calculated from the following Finance and Infrastructure Committee staff reports: 10 June 2020, p. 35; 9 June 2021, p. 39; 9 June 2022, p. 57; 21 June 2023, p. 52. 9 June 2022, p. 53
⁴ Substantive Change Request for Connecticut Community College Consolidation, 11 February 2022, Appendix A Substantive-Change-Request-with-letter.pdf (ct.edu); Finance and Infrastructure Committee staff report, 9 June 2021, p. 10
⁵ Finance and Infrastructure Committee staff report, 9 June 2022, p. 72
⁶ Finance and Infrastructure Committee staff report, 9 June 2022, p. 72
⁷ Finance and Infrastructure Committee staff report, 21 June 2023, p. 69; Full-Time Equivalent (Instructional Activity), Fall 2008-Fall 2022 Full_Time_Equivalent_Instructional_Activity v2022-12-20.xlsx (live.com)
What explains the enormous discrepancy in the two aforementioned projections, made only months apart? Who calculated each projection, and how was each arrived at? Did the managers, administrators, and staff members who wrote and approved the enrollment forecast for NECHE communicate with the managers, administrators, and staff members who wrote and approved the projection included in the Finance Committee report? And why did those in authority, and those in an oversight role, accept—and apparently not even seriously question, if question at all—such patently unrealistic, not to mention widely disparate, projections?

Some recommendations:

1. CSCU enrollment projections should be based on accurate, reliable, pertinent, and critical empirical data, such as documented (not aspirational) retention rates and the number of Connecticut high school graduates per annum, and nothing else. Enrollment forecasts should not be exercises in wishful thinking or marketing and public relations. They should not be used as a ploy to secure accreditation for a consolidated community college system or in the hope of gaining additional state funding for the CSCU system.

2. CSCU and CSCC leadership, as well as the Board of Regents, has a responsibility to scrutinize, question, and, if need be, reject enrollment forecasts that are based on flimsy or no evidence, are unrealistic, or are patently absurd.

3. Enrollment equals tuition and fees that are critically needed to fund CSCU colleges and universities. Enrollment that does not materialize due to inept or deliberately exaggerated forecasting equals budget deficits. Assuming additional state funding will be difficult or impossible to secure over the next several fiscal years, achieving enrollment projections will be critical to the operations of CSCU institutions (especially CSCC, but also WCSU).

4. CSCU leadership must refute the idea that enrollment declines justify decreases, or at least smaller increases, in state support. Student success is labor-intensive, especially given students who must overcome daunting socio-economic, academic, and personal obstacles in order to succeed. The professional faculty and staff who are crucial to student success cannot be had on the cheap.

5. It is worth considering that the CSUs may have had greater success in forecasting enrollment than the community colleges because the former institutions have retained leadership, autonomy, key professional staff, institutional memory, and funding that the latter have lost, especially since the start of the community college consolidation in 2018.

6. In FY 18, both the CCC and CSU systems achieved their enrollment goals. While this might have been happenstance, an investigation into how these forecasts were made and who made them is warranted.
Educators know that in order to assess performance, it is best to rely upon multiple instruments such as tests, quizzes and paper assignments. Some students have strengths in certain domains, be it written, oral, creative or otherwise, which could be unfairly overlooked if a class offers an inadequate variety or number of assessments. With this in mind, it is particularly bothersome to many Connecticut State University (CSU) faculty that the performance of our institutions is so frequently reduced to assessment of a single measure: enrollment. While it is certainly true that enrollments have experienced an ongoing decline, this is only one outcome of relevance when it comes to our public universities.

Focus upon enrollments, to the exclusion of other outcomes, and perseverance about the students not on our campuses would be irresponsible behavior for faculty. We are too busy educating and advising the students who are on our campuses, which is what we should be doing. In fact, one might argue that the relentless, repetitive doomsaying involving enrollments has served as a dangerous distraction that hinders our teaching, scholarship and service to our communities.

Politicians, bureaucrats and non-educators in Hartford like to describe enrollments as “demand.” This is an oversimplistic application of an economic concept to the extraordinarily nuanced process that is learning and achievement in higher education. It is true that an enrolled student has demanded something, but what they demand is a bundle of things possibly including independent living, sports opportunities, classes and partying. However, not all students who enroll in higher education demand a complete educational experience.

We know this is true because completion rates are below 100% on almost all campuses across the United States. Therefore, another measure of demand would be the number of students who complete their higher education. These are the students who demand the full academic experience and demand a credential. Arguably, this is the most important measure of demand because credentialed individuals will find more open doors to opportunity and contribute the most to our state.

The number of non-completers is tallied as the difference between enrollment and completions. Non-completers are students who, for whatever reason, attend a university but leave without earning a credential. A campus or higher education sector producing a high volume of non-completers is not performing well from a social perspective. The reason for this is that non-completers have paid money to institutions, almost always involving debt, but they do not receive the total benefit which is unlocked through graduation. In other industries, when someone pays for a product or service but they do not receive it, we call that outcome fraud. Non-completers are a major cause of the student debt crisis in the United States, because indebted non-graduates struggle to pay student loans.

In the discussion here, I will emphasize outcome measures other than enrollments, for the reasons outlined above. Those measures show that our public universities contribute just as much to our state now as they did 10 or more years ago. Moreover, when we take a wholistic view of the CSUs, we

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1 It is important to note that the discussion of completers here does not apply to the Connecticut community colleges, since completion is a far more difficult concept for those institutions.
conclude that performance of our public universities has actually improved along certain extremely important dimensions. For example, our public universities are producing fewer non-completers. For these reasons, state support for our students and campuses should increase, rather than decline.

Evidence of Improvements in the Connecticut State Universities

For students and their families and friends, pursuit of higher education is an enterprise with an unknown outcome. In the United States, it is also a personally costly enterprise. Evidence from the US Department of Education suggests that, in 2015 and 2016, 3.9 million students dropped out of college after taking out student loans.\(^2\) More recent evidence suggests that 39% of all student loan borrowers do not attain a degree.\(^3\) These indebted individuals are, in some ways, victims of higher education. Every time a student becomes a non-completer, the industry has received revenue from individuals who do not achieve a degree in exchange.

Connecticut’s state universities have significantly reduced the number of individuals who enroll and take out loans but do not complete their studies. We can conclude this from a number of trends. The first of these is the number of students who earn a bachelor’s degree annually from our state universities. This number has not significantly changed over a decade. In 2010, it was 5,190. In 2022, 5,142 graduated with a bachelor’s degree. Our state universities have managed to steadily contribute to Connecticut’s workforce, a praiseworthy accomplishment given the documented instability and inexperience of statewide university leadership over the majority of the corresponding period.

It is true that the number of students enrolled on our state university campuses has declined. However, whether this is a good thing or a bad thing depends upon priorities. There are some commentators, typically non-educators, who focus upon money above all else. Because there are fewer individuals paying money to attend our state university campuses, they conclude that our universities are in decline. This is an oversimplistic and likely erroneous conclusion.

Let’s consider these two facts together: the number of students who earn a bachelor’s degree at our state universities is roughly constant over time. Simultaneously, there are fewer students. Therefore, a higher portion of the student body is actually finishing their degree. This means each student is less likely to be a non-completer. That is, fewer individuals in our state are borrowing, sending money to our public universities, and ending up with little to show for it because they fail to graduate.

Data from the US Department of Education IPEDS database supports this analysis. In 2010, less than 50% of students graduated in six years on the majority of our state university campuses. The graduation rate on our campuses has steadily increased since then. In 2021, every state university campus achieved a graduation rate above 50%. Once again, this result suggests our public universities are more effective than ever before when it comes to supporting students as they seek to make progress towards earning a degree.
It is true that there are side effects from having fewer students enrolled on our campuses. Some observe that, if there are fewer students, our public universities do not require as many faculty. This adjustment has already been made. The number of full-time faculty (AAUP members) on our public university campuses has decreased by 8% since 2016.
The downward slide in faculty numbers is also apparent when we consider part-time AAUP members. On the majority of campuses, fewer part-time faculty have been employed in recent years.
The second side effect of fewer non-completing students is that our campuses receive less revenue. However, the existence of revenue from non-completers is socially undesirable because it represents payments for a credential which a student does not receive.

Let’s next turn to the wider context within which these developments have unfolded on our public university campuses.

**The Higher Education Cost Arms Race**

In certain industries, a competitive advantage is gained through reducing the cost of production and selling a product or service at a lower price. This is not how competition works in higher education, for a variety of reasons. The first of these reasons: price is opaque. Almost every college or university will publish its schedule of tuition, fees, room and board. But, in most circumstances, these are not what students pay. Instead, there is the proffer of “aid” or a “discount” which alters the net expense of attending a college or university. An aid package and after-aid pricing can be difficult to process, particularly for those who have not even graduated from high school yet. Mistakes are easy to make.

There are more important reasons why competition does not create lower costs in higher education. The first of these is the role of services and amenities in recruiting students. Researchers have long known that this creates an arms race dynamic in higher education when it comes to cost. For example, one university may decide it needs a room where students can compete in video games (this is sometimes
referred to as eSports). Soon thereafter, every university in the same competitive cluster has a video game room in order to “keep up” with the other universities adding video game rooms. Costs end up higher at all the universities, but none of them have actually gained a competitive advantage at the end of the day. This is the definition of an inefficient arms race. In an alternate world, each university could have been banned from offering a video game room and all the students would pay lower tuition as a result while gaining the same diplomas (assuming none of the diplomas require a video game room).

The services and amenities arms race is really only one part of a two-part system leading to ever-increasing costs in higher education. The second part is the fact that students do not immediately pay the cost of attending a college or university (even after deducting aid) due to the availability of student loans with virtually unlimited borrowing caps. This means the immense costs of a college or university education can be hidden over long repayment periods and, therefore, recast as acceptable to potential students. For example, suppose a student loan allows repayment of $30,000 for one year of college attendance. Suppose the loan is repaid over 30 years at 5% interest. This creates a monthly payment of $161.

Now suppose an institution increases the cost of one year of attendance by 20% to $36,000. This would be an extraordinarily large increase in cost for a single year of attendance. The monthly repayment of a student loan with the same terms would only increase to $193, or $31 per month. We can see that the existence of student loans reframes a very large increase in educational costs and makes those increases much easier to accept, from a student’s perspective.

This is the way to understand competition in higher education. Management layers on costly services and amenities without end as part of the arms race to attract students. However, at the end of the day, none of the universities gain a competitive advantage. Here is a short list of recent actual amenities from campuses: a buffalo-shaped swimming pool, a rock-climbing rec center, a 125-seat movie theater, big-screen TVs, napping stations, nap pods with spherical domes that lower over the user, a 2,100-gallon aquarium inspired by an episode of Animal Planet’s “Tanked” and putting greens. The existence of student loans means the repayment of these costly and arguably unnecessary amenities is delayed to some point in the future and defrayed over a long repayment period.

**The Higher Education Arms Race in Connecticut Public Higher Education**

The state of Connecticut financially supports two separate higher education systems: the University of Connecticut and the Connecticut State Universities. These two systems compete with one another for students and they also compete with other colleges and universities within Connecticut and across the United States. The University of Connecticut is known as a “flagship” university, in part because the university grants doctorates but also because the university offers a very expensive amenity: numerous Division 1 sports.

A recent *Wall Street Journal* article provides some interesting details about the manner in which the University of Connecticut has participated in the higher education cost arms race. Between 2002 and 2022, UConn increased its expenditures, in real terms, by 73%, the highest rate of any flagship discussed

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5 https://archive.is/O7Py2
in the article (the median rate of increase was 38%). With the volume of amenities and services added due to that spending, UConn was able to increase its enrollments by 42% over the corresponding period. It did manage to stay ahead of other competitors, but it remains to be seen if that pace of cost increase can be maintained. A good example of where UConn expanded financial support for amenities was in sports. According to the article, “since 2016, Connecticut’s athletic department has received more than $35 million annually in student fees and university subsidies to stay afloat. In 2022, it took in $55 million in such funds, making up more than half its total athletics budget.”

The Connecticut State Universities have stayed out of many aspects of the cost arms race, in part by necessity. For example, there has been no serious discussion of expanding into multiple Division 1 sports. From this perspective, the CSUs have served as careful stewards of taxpayer dollars. However, there are reasons to believe that the expansion of enrollments at the University of Connecticut has complicated the effort to maintain or expand enrollments at the Connecticut State Universities. In fact, expansion of enrollments at flagship universities at the expense of enrollments at traditional state universities is a phenomenon gaining more attention. For example, a recent article in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* discusses flagship cannibalization of enrollments at state universities in Oregon, Michigan and other states.

It is unclear if taxpayers and students in Connecticut benefit from any arms race competition between UConn and the CSUs. For example, many of the costly satellite campuses opened by UConn in recent decades have completion rates which are similar to the completion rates we see at the CSUs. Better coordination between UConn and the CSUs could lead to better outcomes for the state, perhaps producing equivalent or better educational experience for students without continuing the unsustainable pace of tuition increases we’ve seen in recent decades.

**CSUs: a Strengthening Public Investment**

Along numerous dimensions, Connecticut’s state universities have noticeably improved their performance and served as careful stewards of taxpayer dollars. Every year for at least ten years in a row, Connecticut State Universities have been a reliable source of at least 5,000 newly credentialed graduates whose skills and potential were enhanced through our educational enterprise. Our public universities continue to offer access to higher education which otherwise might be out of reach for many Connecticut residents. Our campuses offer faculty and staff who are increasingly effective at teaching, advising and mentoring students until they “cross the finish line” with a diploma. In light of these developments, our state should renew its commitment to providing robust resources to our public universities. Doing so is a wise investment.

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6 The CSCU system office recently estimated that, due to cuts in state support, the Connecticut State Universities are projected to see a $46.4 million shortfall, which is less than the amount UConn spent to support athletics alone in 2022. This suggests that our state is comfortable supporting athletics in one system but unwilling to provide more modest support for academic programs in another system.

7 [https://archive.is/3nMhN](https://archive.is/3nMhN)
FAC Resolution on Principles of Respect

1/ Respect the distinct missions of the colleges and universities: The Board is required to provide an annual report to the legislature, which is not currently being done, to indicate how this proviso of Sec. 10a-1c is being fulfilled. In the rush to implement Students First, the Board has neglected this statutory requirement, and has unduly focused on personnel and budgetary rearrangements at the college level.

2/ Respect the autonomy and integrity of the constituent institutions: The CSCU system is a system of six institutions: the four CSU universities, Charter Oak state college, and the now consolidated CT Community College. Each of these constituent units are capable of providing degrees to students. We recommend the system of systems or federated approach which combines respect for the autonomy and integrity of the constituent units with coordination and leadership from the central administration. Policy should be based on consultation and consent of the constituent colleges and universities; command and control due to over-centralization must be abandoned.

3/ Respect shared governance: This implies a willingness to fully take into account the expertise of faculty and staff, and to focus on mutual agreement rather than imposed resolutions to make needed changes in the system. The history of Students First has been one of management assertion rather than collegial cooperation, to the detriment of the educational experience of students, and career satisfaction of faculty, staff and administrators.

4/ Respect faculty control of curriculum and pedagogy: While administration has control of matters such as budget and senior personnel, faculty must, by dint of their expertise, control curriculum and pedagogy - subject to final approval and funding by administration. Imposing courses such as CS-101 or the forced “alignment” of diverse programs for the sake of uniformity destroys the very foundation upon which the CSCU constituent units are based – the classroom, laboratory, seminar and other experiences to which students participate and which faculty prepare and lead.

5/ Respect the relation between the CSCU leadership and System Office staff, the Board, and the constituent units (colleges and universities): Currently the relationship is to a large extent a top-down one of the CSCU executive deciding on a policy, its System Office staff preparing a resolution with accompanying report that is submitted for approval by the Board, which is then imposed on the constituent units (eg the Feb. 2020 financial recission resolution and the recent June 2022 budget remediation and academic program review/planning resolution). This top-down process needs to be reversed, especially on issues related to curriculum and other matters covered by local autonomy of constituent units, with the System Office staff limited to technical assistance upon request.

6/ Respect the role of the Faculty Advisory Committee: To properly “advise and assist” the Board, as is required by section 185 of CT statutes creating both the BOR and the FAC, the following should be implemented:

(a) continue the biannual joint BOR/FAC meetings established after FAC request and currently being implemented;
(b) include a regular FAC agenda item at BOR meetings so that FAC leaders can clearly enunciate concerns and proposals;
(c) count the FAC chair and vice-chair for quorum and votes at committee meetings (eg: ASA and Finance/Infrastructure) so they can amend and improve resolutions to be presented to the Board even if they do not have a vote at Board meetings. This will significantly improve communication and consultation, upon which basis alone cooperation and trust can be built.

Approved unanimously by the FAC, Friday, Oct. 13, 2023